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TENURE: ENDANGERED OR EVOLUTIONARY SPECIES 
James J. Fishman* 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
Fifteen years ago Ralph Brown, then President of the American 
Association of University Professors (AAUP) and a law professor at 
Yale, and Jordan Kurland, then AAUP General Counsel, wrote: 
“. . .academic tenure is always under attack.  Usually we hear only 
grumbling and rumbling, as of distant artillery.  But occasionally there is 
a prolonged fire fight.”1  Today, we are in one of the latter periods. 
Advocates of tenure emphasize its contributions to professional 
excellence and the quest for truth. These benefits are more important 
than individual benefits or the costs to those who fail to gain tenure or to 
universities that lose their flexibility. Critics argue that tenure creates 
excessive social and individual costs because unproductive tenured 
faculty hinders opportunities to hire new faculty or implement 
programmatic innovation.2 
This article will review some of the challenges to the system of 
academic tenure: the efforts to reform, curtail, or eliminate it.  It will 
discuss exogenous factors undermining the institution and then suggest 
some areas where tenure should evolve, particularly focusing upon 
academic tenure in legal education.  The author argues that the 
hierarchical structure of traditionally tenured faculty and other faculty, 
clinicians, and legal writing professors, employed on short or long-term 
contracts, has undermined academic freedom and tenure. 
 
* © 2005 James J. Fishman.  James J. Fishman is a Professor of Law at Pace University School of 
Law. 
 1. Ralph S. Brown & Jordan E. Kurland, Academic Tenure and Academic Freedom, 53 LAW 
& CONTEMP. PROBS. 325, 327 (1990) [emphasis in original]. 
 2. Ernst Benjamin, Some Implications of Tenure for the Profession and Society, at 
http://www.aaup.org/Issues/tenure/Ebten2.htm (last visited April 14, 2005).  For a summary of the 
arguments in favor and against tenure, see generally, James J. Fishman, Tenure and Its Discontents: 
The Worst Form of Employment Relationship Save All of the Others, 21 PACE L. REV. 159 (2000). 
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II.  WHAT IS TENURE? 
At its simplest, academic tenure merely provides that no person 
continuously retained as a full-time faculty member beyond a specified 
and lengthy period of probationary service may thereafter be dismissed 
without adequate cause.3  Basically, it mandates due process in the firing 
decision.  The original purpose of tenure was to provide economic 
security, so that scholars could pursue disinterested scholarship and be 
judged on that scholarship by their peers, rather than by lay employers. 
Of course, tenure is much more: it implicates notions of academic 
freedom, justifies participation in university governance, represents part 
of a social contract that contributes to institutional stability, and—not so 
often acknowledged—manifests a significant status function that in the 
law school context reinforces a hierarchy among people in similar full-
time roles. 
III.  THE EROSION OF TENURED POSITIONS 
Nationally, there has been an erosion of tenured positions and an 
increase of non-tenure-track faculty.  The AAUP calls this cohort 
“contingent faculty.”4  Some statistics confirm this development. In 
1969, 3.3 percent of full-time faculty were hired for non-tenure-track 
positions.5  By the Fall of 1998, twenty-eight percent of full-time faculty 
were in non-tenure track slots.6 Concomitantly, among newly hired full-
time faculty, fifty-five percent were in non-tenure track positions.7  
Other surveys going back a decade have found a majority of new hires 
were off the tenure track. 
A study from the Fall of 2000 by the American Mathematical 
Society starkly demonstrates the erosion of tenured positions.8 Between 
1995 and 2000, the number of tenured faculty in mathematics 
departments in four-year colleges and universities (prime tenure land) 
 
 3. William W. Van Alystyne, Tenure: A Summary, Explanation, and “Defense,” 57 AAUP 
BULL. 328 (1971). 
 4. See AAUP, Contingent Appointments and the Academic Profession (Nov. 9, 2003) 
available at http://www.aaup.org/statements/SpchState/contingent.htm [hereinafter Contingent 
Appointments]. 
 5. Gwendolyn Bradley, Contingent Faculty and the New Academic Labor System, 90:1 
ACADEME 28-31 (2004). 
 6. See Contingent Appointments, supra note 4. 
 7. Id. 
 8. Donna R. Euben, Tenure: Current Perspectives and Challenges, (Oct. 2002), available at 
http://www.aaup.org/Legal/info%20outlines/legtenur.htm (last visited April 14, 2005), citing David 
J. Lutzer, Statistical Abstract of Undergraduate Programs in the Mathematical Sciences in the 
United States: Fall 2000 CBMS Survey, American Mathematical Society (2002). 
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dropped by about three percent.9 The number of tenure-eligible faculty 
dropped by six percent, and the number of full-time faculty, who were 
neither tenured nor tenure-eligible, rose by sixty-five percent.10 
The National Center for Education Statistics of the U.S. 
Department of Education found that twenty-one percent of public 
research, doctoral, and comprehensive universities had replaced tenured 
faculty with full-time faculty on fixed-term contracts between 1992 and 
1998.11  Additionally, the proportion of faculty whose positions are part-
time has increased substantially.  In 1970 twenty-two percent of faculty 
members were in part-time positions.  By 1999, this figure had risen to 
forty-three percent.12  It is ironic that the decline in tenured positions has 
been accompanied by an increase in categories of faculty. While the 
army has twenty-four grades of rank from private to general, Harvard 
University divides its faculty into forty ranks, ranging from teaching 
fellow to professor emeritus.13 
Institutions make little commitment to most contingent faculty or to 
their academic work.  In colleges and universities with large numbers of 
adjunct faculty or full-timers on a non-tenure track, the faculty as a 
group become more fragmented, unsupported and destabilized.14  The 
ultimate impact of the erosion of tenure could be to cut off the flow of 
good people into higher education and to seriously affect future 
scholarship and research. 
Yet, it remains premature to say we are seeing tenure’s death knell. 
Despite its seeming erosion, nearly all universities—doctoral and 
comprehensive—have tenure systems, as do a majority of private 
baccalaureate colleges and community colleges.15  One can expect 
academic tenure to continue to shrink as a proportion of all new 
positions. 
 
 9. Id. 
 10. Id. 
 11. U.S. DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION, NATIONAL CENTER FOR EDUCATION STATISTICS, THE 
CONDITION OF EDUCATION 2003, NCES 2003-067, Table 35-1 at 161.  Sixteen percent of all post-
secondary institutions with tenure systems reported replacing some tenured positions with fixed 
term contracts.  Id. at 69. 
 12. U.S. DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION, DIGEST OF EDUCATIONAL STATISTICS 271, Table 228 
(2001). 
 13. Douglas McGray, Title Wave, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 4, 2002, at A23. 
 14. Bradley, supra note 5. 
 15. About two-thirds of all post-secondary institutions had tenure systems in the Fall of 1998.  
Andrea Berger, et. al. U.S. DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION, NATIONAL CENTER FOR EDUCATION 
STATISTICS, INSTITUTIONAL POLICIES AND PRACTICES: FINDINGS FROM THE 1999 NATIONAL 
STUDY OF POSTSECONDARY FACULTY, INSTITUTION SURVEY, 31 NCES 2001-201 (2001) 
[hereinafter, 1999 STUDY OF POSTSECONDARY FACULTY]. 
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IV.  ALTERNATIVE APPROACHES AND ATTACKS ON TENURE 
A.  The Use of Contracts in Place of Tenure 
Long term or rolling contracts, occasionally referred to as ‘term 
tenure’ in place of traditional tenure, are in place at very few four-year 
institutions.  Under contract systems, the faculty member is initially 
appointed for one to three years, with the terms then extended to seven 
or even ten years.16  Some institutions, particularly those with law 
schools, have contract systems side by side with tenure. 
The simplest way to understand the contrast between a tenure 
system and one governed by long-term contracts is that under the 
former, an employee has the burden of proof of showing fitness during 
the probationary period, and then the burden shifts to the employer to 
determine whether the employee should be dismissed for cause. Under a 
contract system, the burden is always upon the employee to prove his or 
her fitness to continue.17  Two well-known practitioners of contracts in 
place of tenure, Evergreen State in Washington and the University of 
Texas-Permian Basin, have systems with so many procedural protections 
that it has been referred to as ‘tenure by another name.’18 
Empirically, data shows that contract renewals are overwhelming 
and turnover is quite low.19 However, renewable contracts have led to 
serious conflict over academic freedom issues and censure of the 
institution by the AAUP.20  Such conflicts have a destabilizing effect on 
academic communities.21  To conduct meaningful peer review of 
faculties with renewable contracts takes an enormous amount of time 
 
 16. Fishman, supra note 2, at 194.  The recent organizing efforts of graduate students, adjunct 
faculty and medical residents to obtain job security or improvement of working conditions is an 
effort to obtain some of the protections tenure affords.  It is not tenure, however, because contracts 
alone don’t offer the academic freedom protections, the status, nor the traditional rights of shared 
governance.  Id. 
 17. See Ellen Schrecker, The Incredible Shrinking Faculty: An Interview with Lawrence 
Poston, 86 ACADEME 26, 28 (2000). 
 18. See Robert M. O’Neill, Alternatives to Tenure, 27 J.C. & U.L. 573, 577 (2001). 
 19. See Debbie Goldberg, Career Options, WASH. POST, July 27, 1997 at R6 (stating that 83 
percent of Hampshire College’s ninety faculty have ten-year contracts).  For a critique of contract 
systems, see generally Fishman, supra note 2, at 194-98; Michael S. McPherson & Gordon C. 
Winston, The Economics of Academic Tenure: A Relational Perspective, 4 J. ECON. BEHAV. & ORG. 
163, 178-80 (1983). 
 20. See, e.g., Robin Wilson, Bennington President Fires a Professor Who Criticized Her 
Fiercely and Openly, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC., Apr. 28, 2000 at A20.  Bennington had previously 
been censured.  AAUP, Report: Academic Freedom and Tenure: Bennington College, 81 ACADEME 
91 (1995) [hereinafter AAUP Report]. 
 21. AAUP Report, supra note 20. 
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from academic responsibilities such as scholarship, student advising and 
mentoring, and participation in faculty governance.  Finally, it is 
difficult to see how academic freedom can be protected if no one has 
tenure. 
B.  The Market Test of Tenure 
A recent effort to sidestep tenure is to offer financial incentives to 
faculty or faculty candidates, who will eschew tenure or a tenure track 
position.  In one version, the hiring institution offers a prospective 
employee the choice between a tenure-track appointment and 
“renewable tenure;” the latter offers a higher starting salary, more 
lucrative summer grants, and possibly a lighter teaching load.  Tenure, it 
is suggested, will be difficult to attain.22 
A few places have used this approach to encourage tenured faculty 
to renounce their tenure with promise of compensatory advantages.  The 
most notorious was at the University of Central Arkansas, whose efforts 
achieved success with but one professor, and earned censure from the 
AAUP.23  At Boston University’s School of Management, six of the 
twelve faculty accepted an offer to receive a higher salary in exchange 
for renouncing tenure.24  Reward for tenure assumes that the 
administration will continue such a program.  It is based upon trust, but 
administrators and resources change.  Additionally, this approach 
assumes tenure is only for the benefit of the individual faculty member.  
Tenure should be considered more than a property right of the 
individual. It benefits the university community and society.  Trading 
one’s tenure for more money is a wrong to the academic community. 
C.  The Devaluation of the Faculty 
There is a story, probably apocryphal, that shortly after becoming 
president of Columbia University in 1948, Dwight D. Eisenhower 
addressed the faculty.  He kept referring to the faculty as “you” and the 
administration as “the university.”  Isidor I. Rabi, a Nobel-prize-winning 
physicist and faculty member, shouted out a correction: “General, we are 
the university.”25  Times have changed.  There is a decrease in the 
 
 22. Poston, supra note 17, at 27. 
 23. O’Neill, supra note 18, at 577.  AAUP, Academic Freedom and Tenure: University of 
Central Arkansas, 86 ACADEME 101, 112 (2000) (reporting the circumstances leading to the 
Bennington censure). 
 24. Euban, supra note 8. 
 25. In fact, Rabi was a confidant of Eisenhower during his Columbia presidency.  See 
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relative importance of the faculty, one result of the increasing 
corporatization of the university. 
Legislators, higher education governing boards, and their 
administrations have emphasized a number of “market realities” that 
cumulatively diminish faculty preeminence.  Accompanying these have 
been demands for a greater focus on the bottom line. The costs of higher 
education have risen more rapidly than other goods and services in 
recent years.26  New modes of competition have emerged from for-profit 
educational firms and distance learning internet sites that challenge 
traditional educational models.27  By its nature higher education is labor-
intensive.  The major way to reduce costs is to decrease the number of 
full-time faculty. 
The adoption by universities and their law schools of business 
models of the marketplace has increased the importance of skilled 
professional administrators. Increasing external support from 
corporations and ideologically oriented foundations have created 
important external interest groups. 
Higher education and particularly law schools have reacted to U.S. 
News & World Report’s rankings.  Education has become vaudeville. 
Most significant in the law school context is that potential students 
increasingly view themselves as consumers, and matriculated ones see 
themselves as customers.  At many law schools the most important 
appointments are not of the faculty, but the assistant deans of 
development, admissions, career development and most importantly, 
communications.  Faculty usually has no role in their hiring.  These 
developments are the product of general external changes impacting on 
the educational landscape. 
There also have been formal attempts to undermine faculty 
influence.  Shared governance is a corollary of academic freedom and 
one of the fundamental principles of the academic tenure system.28  The 
Association of Governing Boards (AGB) issued an institutional 
governance statement in 1998 that disconnected shared governance from 
academic freedom.29  The AGB imported the concept of stakeholder 
 
ROBERT A. MCCAUGHEY, STAND COLUMBIA 340 (2003). 
 26. This is a primary reason for efforts to undermine tenure. 
 27. See Neil W. Hamilton, Academic Tradition and the Principles of Professional Conduct, 
27 J.C. & U.L. 609-10 (2001). 
 28. See generally, AAUP, American Council on Education & Association of Governing 
Boards of Universities and Colleges, Statement on Government of Colleges and Universities (1966), 
reprinted in AAUP POLICY DOCUMENTS AND REPORTS 179 (1995). 
 29. Assn. Governing Boards of Universities and Colleges, AGB Statement on Institutional 
Governance, reprinted in AGB STATEMENT ON INSTITUTIONAL GOVERNANCE AND GOVERNING IN 
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analysis from corporate law.30  Under the new statement, the faculty 
becomes but one constituency among many that a governing board 
should consider in reaching its decisions.31 
D.  Post-Tenure Review 
The major demand of critics of tenure is to implement some form of 
post-tenure review.  This is a significant development of the last 15 
years.  In 1989 the AAUP reported that less than one percent of its 
membership worked at institutions with a post-tenure review policy.  In 
1998 forty-six percent of 192 four-year institutions had post-tenure 
review policies.32  By 2000, thirty-seven states had established some 
form of post-tenure review for public institutions.33 
At its most innocuous, post-tenure review is merely good 
management and personnel policy.  However, critics of tenure use post-
tenure review as a second chance to get rid of under-performing faculty.  
Aggressive efforts to institute post-tenure review policies, which would 
ease termination of tenured faculty, have generated public battles and 
have been defeated.34 
There is uncertainty as to the percentage of under-performing 
faculty.  Unfortunately, no “deadwood index” exists (where is U.S. 
News when you really need it?).35  There are a few estimates.  Henry 
Rosovsky, former dean of Harvard’s Faculty of Arts and Sciences, 
estimated that the deadwood label would apply to under two percent of a 
major university faculty.36  Brown and Kurland estimate that the 
percentage of under-performers at institutions where tenure is easily 
granted is less than five percent.37  Even legislators favoring mandatory 
 
THE PUBLIC TRUST: EXTERNAL INFLUENCES ON COLLEGES AND UNIVERSITIES (2001) [hereinafter 
AGB STATEMENT].  The 1998 statement differs greatly in tone from the 1966 document. 
 30. See generally, STEPHEN BAINBRIDGE, CORPORATION LAW AND ECONOMICS 27-29 
(2002). 
 31. See AGB STATEMENT, supra note 29. 
 32. Euben, supra note 8. 
 33. Id.  There are four types: mandated by state legislatures; required by state systems of 
higher education; negotiated in collective bargaining agreements; and created voluntarily.  Id. 
 34. See e.g., Jennifer Jacobson, Northeastern U. Professors Reject Tenure Changes, CHRON. 
HIGHER EDUC., June 15, 2001 at A10; Denise K. Magner, Fierce Battle Over Tenure at U. 
Minnesota Ends Quietly, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC., June 20, 1997 at A14; Fred L. Morrison, Tenure 
Wars: An Account of the Controversy at Minnesota, 47 J. LEGAL EDUC. 369 (1997). 
 35. “Deadwood,” the phrase used to refer to under-performing tenured faculty, means 
anything useless and burdensome.  RANDOM HOUSE UNABRIDGED DICTIONARY 512 (2d ed. 1993).  
Under that definition, such a faculty member could be removed from her post for cause. 
 36. HENRY ROSOVSKY, THE UNIVERSITY: AN OWNER’S MANUAL 210-11 (1990). 
 37. Brown & Kurland, supra note 1, at 332.  Robert B. Conrad and Louis A Trosch estimate 
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post-tenure review admit that the number of faculty needing 
improvement or pasture is less than two percent.38 
As Harold Shapiro, former president of Princeton, has said: “[w]e 
should disconnect such ongoing periodic evaluations from the question 
of tenure itself.  Any attempt to link to the issue of tenure and periodic 
evaluation of tenured faculty, no matter how well-meaning, is, in my 
judgment, unlikely to strengthen our institutions.”39  The position of the 
AAUP seems eminently sensible.  Post-tenure reviews should be aimed 
at constructive measures for improvement. It should not be a 
smokescreen to revisit the tenure decision.  Of particular importance, 
faculty rather than administrators should have primary responsibility for 
conducting the review.  The dismissal standard should remain just cause, 
and all procedural protections should apply.40 
If post-tenure review is undertaken, it requires an enormous use of 
faculty resources to do properly.  Because of this, it is time-consuming 
for faculty.  It necessarily will take them away from other 
responsibilities and can lead to conflict.41  Universities can get rid of 
under-performing faculty.  Procedures exist to remove unproductive 
faculty for cause.  However, because of the legalization of the process of 
dismissal, administrators are loath to exercise these rights.  Legal 
proceedings take years to conclude, and many administrators using a 
cost-benefit analysis find it is easier to leave the under-performers in 
place.  That reflects less on academic tenure than administrative 
prioritizing.  Clearly, dismissing a professor for cause is expensive, takes 
time and resources, is disruptive, and requires hardballing by the 
administration.  Only about fifty to seventy-five tenured faculty lose 
their positions for cause annually.42  Others avoid the formal dismissal 
process. They retire, are bought out, or resign.43 
 
that only 10 percent of faculty members are marginally unproductive. Dr. Robert B. Conrad and Dr. 
Louis A. Trosch, Renewable Tenure, 27 J.L. & EDUC. 551, 562 (1998). 
 38. Denise K. Magner, U. of Texas Starts System of Post-Tenure Reviews, CHRON. HIGHER 
EDUC., Dec. 20, 1996, at A10 (State Senator Teel Bivins: “I believe that less than 2 percent of the 
professors in Texas are really a problem and would need to have this system in place either to 
address their short comings, or else be dismissed.”). 
 39. Brown & Kurland, supra note 1, at 343. 
 40. AAUP Committee on Academic Freedom and Tenure, Post-Tenure Review: An AAUP 
Response, 84 ACADEME 61, 67 (1998). 
 41. Arguments pro and con are developed by Ira Robbins.  Ira Robbins, Exploring the 
Concept of Post-Tenure Review in Law Schools, 9 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 387, 393-94 (1998). 
 42. Carla Anne Robbins, Crash Course: For Harvard Board, Professor’s Woes Pose Big 
Dilemma, WALL ST. J., Oct. 12, 2004 at A1. 
 43. See e.g., Joann S. Lublin, Travel Expenses Prompt Yale to Force Out Institute Chief, 
WALL. ST. J., Jan. 10, 2005 at B1 (discussing a tenured faculty member, who double-billed 
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Separating post-tenure review from the rhetoric of termination is 
the key to its success.  As former Yale president Kingman Brewster once 
wrote: 
Any system of periodic review subject to the sanction of dismissal, 
would both dampen the willingness to take on long term intellectual 
risks and inhibit if not corrupt the free and spirited exchanges on which 
the vitality of a community of scholars depends.  This, not the 
aberrational external interference, is the threat to the freedom of the 
academic community which tenure seeks to mitigate.44 
V.  EVOLUTIONARY NEEDS OF ACADEMIC TENURE 
Thus far, we have examined efforts that attempt to chip away at 
academic tenure. The institution cannot become fossilized, but must 
react to justified criticisms and changes in the professoriate and society. 
A.  Academics’ Responsibilities 
Complementing efforts to reduce the protections of tenure is the 
demand that faculty recognize that tenure’s privileges carry with them 
responsibilities, one of which is ongoing peer review and monitoring of 
the behavior of one’s colleagues.  The academic responsibility approach 
is a kind of a soft-core post-tenure review. 
That approach represents an effort to remind faculty that the 
freedoms and processes of tenure are combined with obligations—which 
faculty often glides over—the way film-goers view screen credits for 
wardrobe, makeup and grip. Neil Hamilton of William Mitchell School 
of Law has written comprehensively and intelligently on this subject.45  
Tenure is part of a social contract with rights and obligations. Hamilton 
views post-tenure review as a demand for continuing peer review of 
tenured professors on a regular basis.  Peer review is the linchpin of 
professional academic freedom.  The tradition of faculty self-governance 
through peer review of professional competence and ethics makes 
professional academic freedom and not the tenure system, which has 
many parallels in other employment settings, unique. “The principal 
purpose of academic due process,” says Hamilton, “is to maximize 
 
university and resigned his tenured position). 
 44. Howard Mumford Jones, The American Concept of Academic Freedom, 46 AAUP 
BULLETIN 383 (1960). 
 45. See generally, Neil W. Hamilton, Academic Tradition and the Principles of Professional 
Conduct, 27 J.C. & U.L. 609 (2001). 
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protection of the rights of academic freedom, while providing a means 
for peers to enforce its correlative obligations.”46  In practice, once 
tenure has been achieved, the intensity of peer review becomes 
dramatically lower. 
Hamilton notes that individual faculty members have duties 
correlative with the rights of academic freedom and correctly observes 
there is little discussion of the ethical responsibilities of those within the 
university. These responsibilities of professional conduct are embedded 
in the AAUP’s 1915 General Declaration of Principles, and in the 1940 
AAUP/AAC Statement of Principles on Academic Freedom and 
Tenure.47 However, he claims that “[a] profession unable to articulate 
publicly a compelling narrative justifying its privileges and unwilling to 
fulfill the correlative obligations of its social compact will ultimately be 
seen as no different from other business enterprises in a market 
economy.”48 
The challenge to tenured professors today is “directed at the failure 
of peer review adequately to enforce the correlative duties of 
professional competence and ethical conduct following the grant of 
tenure.”49  Administrators may conduct annual evaluations of individual 
professors’ work in assessing sabbatical or additional resource requests, 
but these decisions do not involve peer review.  Competent review is 
itself time-consuming and takes tenured faculty away from research, 
teaching, and other public service.  A university’s mission of the 
creation and dissemination of knowledge is better served by a system 
that is more forgiving of error than one that is too restrictive. Still, 
faculty has a “duty to determine when individual professors inadequately 
meet their responsibilities of professional competence,” and then to take 
the initiative in getting rid of the incompetent.50 
Faculty should have the responsibility to develop and nurture 
departmental, school, or institutional norms of appropriate conduct and 
competence.  Principles of peer review and faculty governance would 
seem to charge faculty with taking the initiative in dealing with the 
incompetent colleague or with inappropriate behavior.  Unfortunately, 
most faculty treat non-performing faculty as the dean’s responsibility.  
 
 46. Id. at 621. 
 47. See generally, General Report of the Committee on Academic Freedom and Academic 
Tenure, 1 AAUP BULL. 17 (1915), reprinted in 53 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 393 (1990); 1940 
Statement of Principles on Academic Freedom and Tenure, reprinted in AAUP POLICY 
DOCUMENTS AND REPORTS 3 (1995); Hamilton, supra note 27, at 625-37. 
 48. Hamilton, supra note 27, at 614. 
 49. Id. at 622. 
 50. Id. at 649, 651. 
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Alas, over the years this writer has been a co-conspirator in that attitude.  
There seems an inherent conflict between the autonomy of faculty 
research and teaching and the demand for collective action to create and 
enforce behavior and professional norms.  However, tenure creates a 
responsibility to the community.  Hamilton is surely correct that the 
faculty needs to do more in terms of post-tenure peer review of problem 
colleagues. 
Codes of conduct have a superficial appeal, but academic 
responsibility is difficult to define concretely, and increasingly 
subjective when applied to specific cases.  One should not be sanguine 
about the effectiveness of peer pressure and review in difficult cases, 
though it can work well in setting aspirational norms that most will try to 
follow.  There will be increasing pressure in this area. 
B.  Lengthening the Probationary Period 
One of the most significant changes in higher education is the 
increased number of women and persons of color who have joined 
faculties.  Two decades ago, ninety percent of full-time faculty were 
white males.  Today women represent thirty-eight percent of full-time 
faculty.  Fifteen percent of full-time faculty are persons of color.51  
Though women represent sixty percent of undergraduate matriculants, 
and in 2001-2002 for the first time earned more doctorates than men, 
they are still under represented at all levels in the nation’s research 
universities, particularly among tenured faculty.52 
There are many reasons for this disparity, but one is the conflict 
between family and professional responsibilities, which are particularly 
harsh to women on the tenure track.53  The time constraints to earn 
tenure, as well as professional demands, have forced many qualified 
women and persons of color off the tenure track, perpetuating under 
representation. Many faculty members’ probationary years intersect with 
the primary years of child bearing and raising.  The normal requirement 
that the six-year probationary clock starts to run with the commencement 
of hiring forces many young scholars to make a difficult and unfair 
 
 51 1999 STUDY OF POSTSECONDARY FACULTY, supra note 15. 
 52 See Robin Wilson, Women in Higher Education: Where the Elite Teach, It’s Still a Man’s 
World, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC., Dec. 3, 2004 at A8.  According to AALS statistics, 75.4 percent of 
tenured faculty are male and 62.2 percent of faculty on a tenure track, but as yet untenured, are 
male.  Contract professors are 52.9 percent female.  Email from Rick White, AALS (Jan. 5, 2005, 
11:56 EST) (on file with the Akron Law Review). 
 53 See Piper Fogg, Family Time: Why Some Women Quit Their Coveted Tenure-Track Jobs, 
CHRON. HIGHER EDUC., June 13, 2003 at A8. 
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choice: family or career. 
Tenure practices need to evolve to attenuate this problem.  The 
American Council on Education has recommended that tenure be more 
flexible by extending the probationary period for recently hired 
professors to up to ten years with reviews at set intervals.  This longer 
probationary period would not be available for all faculty, only those 
who need it.  Nor would standards or criteria change.54  Complementing 
flexible probation should be the allowance of part-time status during 
years of family responsibilities and extended leaves of absence if 
necessary. 
Tenure procedures need to reflect the new demographics and needs 
of incoming faculty.  This is a current need, but if tenure cannot evolve 
to satisfy the needs of the new demographics, there will be severe 
problems in the future as the best minds will eschew higher education. 
VI.  LAW SCHOOL ISSUES 
A.  A Sidebar on Academic Freedom and Its Relation to Tenure 
Academic freedom is sometimes confused with and used as a 
synonym for tenure. Academic freedom allows professionals to seek and 
discover, teach, and publish absent outside interference.  Tenure is a 
buttress—a guarantor—of academic freedom. It protects academic 
freedom through the requirement of academic due process before 
dismissal. An erosion of tenure places academic freedom at risk. 
The procedures of the tenure system ensure that “personnel 
decisions are based largely on scholarship and teaching ability by 
placing primary responsibility for hiring and promotion on one’s 
peers.”55  Such procedures “limit the occasions when major personnel 
decisions will be made.”56  They specifically “free[] the mature scholar, 
after a probationary period, from the primary concern about losing her 
job.”57  
Professors often consider academic freedom as a personal right, and 
use the term academic freedom to refer to liberties they claim through 
 
 54. American Council on Education, An Agenda for Excellence: Creating Flexibility in 
Tenure-Track Faculty Careers at 10 (2005), available at http://www.acenet.edu/bookstore/ 
pubInfo.cfm?pubID=330. 
 55. J. Peter Byrne, Academic Freedom: A Special Concern of the First Amendment, 99 YALE 
L.J. 251, 310-11 (1989).  This article is the most useful introduction to this subject. 
 56. Id. 
 57. Id. 
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professional channels against administrative or political interference 
with their research, teaching, representation, and governance.  However, 
judges and academics have different ideas as to the meaning of academic 
freedom.58  Academic freedom as it relates to the individual faculty 
member differs from constitutional academic freedom, which concerns 
legal doctrine and the insulation of scholarship and liberal education 
from extramural legal interference. 
Many academics would be surprised, if not unsettled, to learn that 
at least in the private university, principles of academic freedom as 
outlined in the 1940 and 1970 AAUP statements are norms, or perhaps a 
matter of contract between professor and university, rather than 
constitutional protections.  The constitutional protections in the court 
decisions relate to the university. Constitutional academic freedom is a 
qualified right of an academic institution to be free from governmental 
interference in its core administrative activities—hiring and firing.59 
Thus, the Supreme Court has protected the corporate capacity of the 
University to be free from governmental interference.  It is that 
institutional autonomy which is protected.60 
B.  The Hierarchical Structure of Law Faculties 
Law schools and their faculties traditionally have had more 
freedom to structure themselves than the rest of the university, through 
the framework of their accrediting bodies.  Yet most law schools have 
undermined the system of tenure by creating a hierarchy within the 
teaching faculty of traditional tenured and tenure-eligible positions, 
clinical faculty who may be on long-term contracts, and legal writing 
professors who may be on short or long-term contracts.61 
The law school experience is not the same as growth of contingent 
faculty in other areas of the university.  It is more like placing all 
members of the German Department on a contract track, and all 
members of the French Department on tenure-eligible lines.  The ABA 
standards have assisted this development, belatedly allowing clinicians 
to receive some long-term security “reasonably similar” to tenure.  That 
 
 58. Id. at 254-55. 
 59. See Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234, 261-62 (1957) (Frankfurter, J., concurring). 
 60. See Urofsky v. Gilmore, 216 F.3d 401, 410 (4th Cir. 2000).  “[A]s far as the courts are 
concerned, administrators may exercise extensive control over curricular judgments so long as they 
do not penalize a professor solely for his political viewpoint.”  Byrne, supra note 55, at 301-2. 
 61. According to the most recent data, 71 percent of law faculty are tenured or on a tenure 
track; 16.4 percent are contract appointees, and for 12.5 percent there is no data.  Email from Rick 
White, AALS (Jan. 5, 2005, 11:56 EST) (on file with the Akron Law Review). 
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may be in the form of  long-term contracts, but it is not the same as 
tenure. 62  Some institutions provide clinicians with tenure.  The ABA 
Standards offer legal writing professors even less protection.63 
The typical law school faculty structure is an unfortunate mistake, a 
self-inflicted wound with significant impact on academic freedom and 
on faculty solidarity against such attempted intrusions.  Law schools 
should have created separate departments for clinical faculty and legal 
writing professors with separate tenure standards. 64  One would not be 
surprised if faculty in the physics department looked down upon 
sociology, if not sociologists, as being less rigorous, let alone faculty in 
the department of journalism or even the school of law.  However, once 
the university creates a department for that discipline, the physicist 
probably would not suggest a different level of security or protection 
under the tenure system.  The hierarchy created by most law schools has 
done just that.  It’s sort of like saying the First Amendment should only 
 
 62. A.B.A., STANDARDS FOR APPROVAL OF LAW SCHOOLS, Chapter 4: The Faculty, 
Standard 405. Professional Environment (2004-05), available at http://www.abanet.org/legaled/ 
standards/chapter4.html.  The standards state: 
(b) A law school shall have an established and announced policy with respect to 
academic freedom and tenure of which Appendix I herein is an example but is not 
obligatory.   
(c) A law school shall afford to full-time clinical faculty members a form of security of 
position reasonably similar to tenure, and non-compensatory perquisites reasonably 
similar to those provided other full-time faculty members.  A law school may require 
these faculty members to meet standards and obligations reasonably similar to those 
required of other full-time faculty members. However, this Standard does not preclude a 
limited number of fixed, short-term appointments in a clinical program predominantly 
staffed by full-time faculty members, or in an experimental program of limited duration.   
(d) A law school shall afford legal writing teachers such security of position and other 
rights and privileges of faculty membership as may be necessary to (1) attract and retain 
a faculty that is well qualified to provide legal writing instruction as required by 
Standard 302(a)(2), and (2) safeguard academic freedom. 
Id. 
 63. Id. at §401(d). 
 64. Separate departments based on differing teaching methodologies and academic norms 
would have a significant impact on the structure of law school governance.  Tenure decision-making 
would become more similar to the rest of the university.  The initial decision would be made by the 
department faculty, clinical or legal writing, and then go before a school-wide committee for 
review, and then be passed onto the university administration.  A departmental structure might make 
more difficult the drifting of clinical or legal writing faculty into more traditional courses, because 
of the departmental wall.  For law school deans, a departmental structure would increase their 
authority vis-à-vis the faculty.  Under present governance structures, deans are at best primus inter 
pares in relation to faculty.  Departments, which would have their own budgets, would create an 
important administrative layer between dean and faculty.  This should enhance decanal power and 
align law deans with the decanal structures of other schools in the university.  Law dean tenure 
might increase.  One should not fantasize that faculty would welcome such a change, let alone vote 
for it. 
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apply to U.S. citizens with a certain net worth. 
C.  Attacks on Academic Freedom 
Theoretically, the same academic freedom exists for the most 
recently hired adjunct or untenured faculty member as for the most 
senior tenured professor.  The tenured faculty should protect the 
untenured.  It is questionable whether that ideal exists.65  The 
hierarchical structure of law faculties has created fissures where there 
should be solidarity and undermined tenure and academic freedom.  
We tend to think that attacks on academic freedom are relics of the 
McCarthy era, a time in the words of the writer Harold Brodkey, when 
the nation “walked on tiptoe.”66  Threats to academic freedom exist 
today.67  Arab-Americans have been fired or threatened with dismissal 
from their positions for being Arab, or for their politics.68  Politicians 
regularly demand that controversial faculty members be fired.69  Drug 
companies have attempted to muzzle the unpalatable results of 
sponsored research.70  In law schools the major threat to academic 
freedom has been attacks on the activities and clients of law school 
clinics. 
D.  Attacks on Law School Clinics 
Robert Kuehn and Peter Joy have shown in an excellent article, “An 
Ethics Critique of Interference in Law School Clinics,”71 that since the 
 
 65. See generally, J. Peter Byrne, Academic Freedom of Part-Time Faculty, 27 J.C. & U.L. 
583 (2001). 
 66. See Harold Brodkey, The Last Word on Winchell, THE NEW YORKER, Jan. 30, 1995 at 71, 
77-78, quoted in Irving Louis Horowitz, Culture, Politics and McCarthyism: A Retrospective from 
the Trenches, 22 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 357, 358 (1996). 
 67. See Patrick D. Healy, College Cancels Speech Over 9/11 Remarks, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 2, 
2005 at B1; N.R. Kleinfield, Mideast Tensions Are Getting Personal on Campus at Columbia, N.Y. 
TIMES, Jan. 18, 2005, at B1; Scott Smallwood, Colorado Regents Will Investigate Professor Who 
Compared September 11 Victims to Nazis, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC., Feb. 2, 2005. 
 68. See Jeffrey S. Strauss, Dangerous Thoughts? Academic Freedom, Free Speech and 
Censorship Revisited in a Post-September 11th America, 15 WASH. U. J.L. &  POL’Y 343, 343 
(2004). 
 69. See David Glenn, Professor Who Said CBS Memos on Bush Might Not Be Fakes Is 
Pilloried by Critics Who Want Him Fired, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC., Oct. 6, 2004, available at 
http://chronicle.com/daily/2004/10/2004100602n.htm; Jennifer Jacobson, U.S. Lawmaker Urges 
Columbia U. to Fire Critic of Israel, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC., Oct. 27, 2004, available at http:// 
chronicle.com/daily/2004/10/2004102702n.htm. 
 70. See Philip J. Hilts, Company Tried to Block Report That Its H.I.V. Vaccine Failed, N.Y. 
TIMES, Nov. 1, 2000 at A26 (California company sued university and researchers to block 
publication of scientific papers and seeks damages of $7 million.). 
 71. Robert R. Kuehn & Peter Joy, An Ethics Critique of Interference in Law School Clinics, 
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late 1960s, politicians, attorneys, business interests and university 
officials have attacked law school clinics and their choices of clients and 
cases.  This is no different an academic freedom issue from outsiders 
attacking a traditional faculty member’s choice of a casebook or the 
content of her torts course. 
This author contacted Professors Kuehn and Joy about the reaction 
of traditional tenured faculty to the travails of clinics under attack, and 
whether they thought the law school faculty structure undermined 
academic freedom.72  As to the impact on academic freedom of contract 
status in place of traditional tenure, they responded that clinical teachers 
without tenure have felt more vulnerable to political attacks, particularly 
if the interference was internal. When the controversy arose externally, 
clinicians have a much greater reason to fear loss of job or otherwise feel 
pressured to concede or yield some decision-making power in the 
selection of cases, clients, teaching methods, or goals. Professor Joy 
added that the absence of tenure influenced many in their choices of 
clinical cases and led to the self-censorship of potentially controversial 
cases.73 
The reaction of traditional tenured faculty to controversies 
involving clinics, said Professors Kuehn and Joy, has been a “mixed 
bag.”  Some tenured faculty members have been very supportive, 
recognizing the attacks on academic freedom. Others just don’t 
understand the academic freedom analogue.  Some law faculty worried 
about the effect of the clinics’ actions on the law school, have stood 
silent, or recommended that the clinical professor back off of the case or 
client.  The second-class status of clinical professors at some schools 
contributed to the lack of respect and appreciation of the clinician’s 
situation.74 
The hierarchical structure of the law schools and the attenuated 
protections of academic freedom have, in some cases, made interference 
in clinics easier, for clinicians are more vulnerable than traditional 
faculty. This is a significant subject for broader inquiry. If Professors 
Kuehn and Joy’s impressions are widely shared, then legal education 
should consider broadening the application of tenure, if only to reinforce 
 
71 FORDHAM L. REV. 1971 (2003). 
 72. Email from Peter Joy, Professor of Law, Washington University in St. Louis, to James 
Fishman, Professor of Law, Pace University School of Law (Dec. 13, 2004, 05:12 EST) (copy on 
file with the Akron Law Review). 
 73. Id.  He noted that in many situations the controversy arose unexpectedly.  Id. 
 74. Id.  This also was exacerbated by the geographical distance of many clinics from the rest 
of the law school.  Id. 
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notions of academic freedom. 
Tenure will remain under attack, but will survive. It must evolve to 
meet new needs and challenges.  In the law school context, tenure should 
become more inclusive of all full-time faculty.  This would strengthen 
the institution. 
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